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Manuel v. United States: The Question of the Exclusivity Rule
in Section 745 of the Suits in Admiralty Act
According to Justice Story's depiction in Harden v. Gordon,1
seamen are "poor and friendless," and "are by the peculiarity of their
lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to
perils, and exhausting labour."2  Based on this understanding,
"maintenance and cure has long been recognized in general maritime
law as a right granted to seamen who are injured or fall ill while in
the service of a ship."3  The right to maintenance and cure is
grounded in the concern that "[i]f some provision [is] not made for
them in sickness at the expense of the ship, they must often... suffer
the accumulated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish
from the want of suitable nourishment., 4 Significantly, in 1920 Con-
gress enacted both the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)5 and the Jones
Act6 in order to redress grievances arising from seamen's injuries and
to promote the safety and welfare of American seamen.7 The SAA is
a comprehensive waiver of the United States's sovereign immunity
1. 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
2. Id. at 483.
3. Julie R. Wohlgemuth, Comment, Wrongful Denial of Maintenance and Cure:
Opening the Damages Floodgate, 18 TUL. MAR. L.J. 109, 109 (1993); see Vaughan v. At-
kinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962); Virginia A. McDaniel, Note, Recognizing Modern
Maintenance and Cure as an Admiralty Right, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 669, 672 (1991).
Maintenance is the right of a seaman to food and lodging if he falls ill or is injured while
in the service of a ship; cure is the right to necessary medical services. See, e.g., Calmar
S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527-28 (1938). Maintenance and cure is available to a
seaman no matter the type of ship on which he serves, provided only that the fundamental
test of admiralty jurisdiction is met: the structure must qualify as a vessel. See GRANT
GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 283 (2d ed. 1975).
4. Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 483. Maintenance and cure also serves "the great public
policy of preserving this important class of citizens for the commercial service and mari-
time defense of the nation." Id.
5. Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (1994)).
6. Jones Act of 1920, ch. 250,41 Stat. 988 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 46 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
7. Both the Jones Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act were enacted to promote the
welfare of the American seamen in the merchant marines of the United States. See An-
drew Hoang Do, Seaman Remedies And Maritime Releases: A Practical Consideration, 7
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 379, 379 (1995). Specifically, the Jones Act was the culmination of a
long struggle by seamen to secure more adequate relief in case of injury or death incurred
in the course of employment than had been afforded by preexisting law. See Warner v.
Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934); Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.
1932).
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for admiralty claims arising from the use of government-owned ships
as merchant vessels."
While the SAA affords seamen explicit protection of life and
limb aboard American flag vessels, there has been substantial confu-
sion as to when and how the SAA applies In 1950, Congress
amended the SAA by modifying § 745 so as to explicitly designate
the United States as the entity to whom a claim for loss caused by a
government ship should be directed."
The legislative history of § 745 indicates that the amendment was
intended to exempt operators of government ships from liability for
negligence." However, both the amendment and the legislative his-
tory are silent on whether private operators can be sued on other
grounds, and therefore confusion surrounding application of the
SAA remains." After the amendment of § 745, it was unclear
whether seamen could sue the private operator of a government-
owned ship for willful and arbitrary denial of benefits.3 Recently, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Manuel v. United States'4
confronted this question, rejected a view that seamen can sue private
8. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (1994); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 982.
9. See infra notes 56-126 and accompanying text.
10. Section 745 provides:
[W]here a remedy is provided by this chapter it shall hereafter be exclusive of
any other action by reason of the same subject matter against the agent or em-
ployee of the United States or of any incorporated or unincorporated agency
thereof whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
46 U.S.C. app. § 745.
11. The Senate Report on § 745 of the SAA explained that when the government
owns a vessel, the United States is the only responsible party for the negligence of the
private operator. See S. REP. No. 81-1782, at 2 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4209, 4210. Furthermore, failure to pay maintenance and cure is tortious conduct which
makes the employer responsible. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW 308 (2d ed. 1994).
12. The legislative history of § 745 indicates that "[t]he legislation is not intended to
affect existing rights of seamen against their vessels or against private companies who
operate Government-owned vessels, or to affect remedies which may exist against other
parties involved by existing law in any appropriate forum." S. REP. No. 81-1782, at 2,
reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4209,4210.
13. Courts have reached different results. Compare Fratus v. United States, 859 F.
Supp. 991, 994 (E.D. Va. 1994) (denying seaman's action against agent of United States
which operated government-owned vessel), and Farnsworth v. Sea-Land Serv. Inc., No.
CIV.A. 87-5954, 1989 WL 20544, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 1989) (denying seaman's action
against private agent), affd, 896 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision),
with Williams v. Central Gulf Lines, 874 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
exclusivity provision of SAA did not bar action against private maritime employer,
though vessel was under time charter to the United States at the time of seaman's death),
and Shields v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (allowing a seaman to
sue the private operator).
14. 50 F.3d 1253 (4th Cir. 1995).
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agents for willful conduct, and held that a seaman had no action
against the private operator under § 745 of the SAA even though the
private operator willfully denied maintenance and cure benefits."5
This Note focuses on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Manuel, in-
cluding its impact on a seaman's right to maintenance and cure after
an injury on a government-owned vessel. 6 After reviewing the perti-
nent facts of the case and the court's holding,1 7 this Note recounts the
legislative and judicial development of the SAA.18 Specifically, this
Note examines the problems and confusions of the SAA as passed in
1920 and the eventual amendment of § 745 in 1950.'9 Next, the Note
analyzes the reasoning in Manuel and describes how it began a trend
toward interpreting § 745 in a narrow manner.? The Note then
points out that although the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 745
seems to be in the mainstream, its practical effect will be to curtail a
plaintiff seaman's right to timely maintenance and cure.21 The Note
concludes that unless Congress clarifies the current statute, seamen
aboard government-owned, but privately operated, vessels will not
receive needed protection.'
In Manuel, petitioner Michael Manuel, an employee of Interna-
tional Marine Carrier (IMC), was a merchant seaman aboard a public
vessel owned by the United States and operated by IMC. 2 He suf-
fered a back injury while working on the vessel. ' Subsequently,
Manuel was paid maintenance and cure during the time he was under
a doctor's care.' However, he did not receive additional mainte-
nance and cure for his continuing medical costs after he returned to
work.26
As a result, Manuel filed suit against both the United States and
IMC in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
15. See id. at 1254.
16. See infra notes 127-73 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 44-117 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 127-65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
22. See infra text accompanying note 173.
23. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1254.
24. See id.
25. See id. Before he was found fit for duty, Manuel was paid the cost of room and
board and medical bills. See id.
26. See id. In terms of cure, the courts have not set any time limit on the duration of
the shipowner's liability, so long as there is a chance of improvement in the claimant's
condition. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 299.
1997]
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Virginia.' He alleged the negligence of the defendants for failure to
provide maintenance and cure and for the unseaworthiness of the
vessel.28 The district court, however, granted the United States's mo-
tion for summary judgment on IMC's behalf and denied Manuel's
motion to amend his pleading to state a claim against IMC for arbi-
trary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.29 Manuel
appealed the district court's denial of his motion to amend.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court decision.31 In delivering the opinion, Judge
Russell first noted that the issue was whether a seaman on a vessel
owned by the United States, but operated by a private agent, could
bring a claim against the agent, instead of the United States, for arbi-
trary and willful denial of maintenance and cure.32 The choice of
defendants was important because if Manuel had to sue the United
States under the SAA, he could not seek punitive damages and at-
torney's fees against the United States.3 On the other hand, if
Manuel could sue the private operator of the vessel, he would have a
chance under current law to seek attorney's fees and possibly puni-
tive damages."
Although a federal district court case, Shields v. United States,5
directly addressed the issue, the Manuel court rejected the reasoning
27. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1254. The United States government is immune from suit
unless Congress specifically waives that immunity. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
392,399 (1976). Under § 745 of the SAA, the United States has waived sovereign immu-
nity and seamen can bring actions against the United States. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 745
(1994).
28. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1254. Unseaworthiness is "[a] condition which arises from
a defect in a vessel's hull, gear, appurtenances, and in some circumstances her crew."
BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1539 (6th ed. 1990). Seaworthiness is a warranty of fitness
for duty. See Martinez v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 763 F.2d 26,27 (1st Cir. 1985). In order to
state a cause of action for unseaworthiness, a plaintiff must allege that his injury was
caused by a defective condition of the ship, its equipment, or its appurtenances. See The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
29. See Manuel v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 478,482 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 50 F.3d
1253 (4th Cir. 1995).
30. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1255. Manuel did not appeal the district court's granting
of summary judgment in IMC's favor on the negligence and unseaworthiness claims. See
id.
31. See id. at 1254.
32. See iL
33. The United States government has not consented to be sued for punitive damages
under the SAA. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1994); Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1260 n.6.
34. Cf Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962) (awarding attorney's fees to
the injured seaman). However, after the Manuel decision, many courts began to hold that
punitive damages are unavailable in this situation. See infra notes 161-62.
35. 662 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
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of Shields and presented its own interpretation of § 745.36 The opin-
ion in Manuel presented two inquiries into the meaning of the SAA.
First, the court examined the legislative intent behind § 745.37 The
court extensively discussed the Supreme Court cases before the 1950
amendment of § 745 and ruled that Congress intended the SAA to be
the exclusive remedy for seamen.38 In its second inquiry, the court
determined the meaning of the statute itself. More specifically, the
court analyzed whether the language prevents a seaman from suing
the private operator of a government-owned ship for the arbitrary
and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. 9 By framing the is-
sue as one for maintenance and cure generally, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that suing the agent for its wrongful conduct and suing the
United States for maintenance and cure are the same subject matter
under § 745.' The Fourth Circuit's ruling thus effectively precludes
all suits by seamen against government vessel operators who wrong-
fully withhold maintenance and cure.4' Clearly recognizing the
unfairness of the result and its undesirable consequences,4' the court
appealed to Congress to correct this problem by "carving out a main-
tenance and cure exception to the exclusivity rule."43
Although the court's decision in Manuel may at first seem to be
the result of reading a statute according to its plain meaning,' an ex-
aination of the history and policy leading to the amendment of
§ 745 reveals that the Manuel decision was not exactly in line with the
legislative intent or with general maritime policy concerning the
safety and welfare of seamen.45 The American government has long
been a participant in the shipping industry," as indicated by the many
lawsuits filed either by the United States or against it.47 In litigation
36. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1255-60.
37. See id. at 1257.
38. See id at 1257-59.
39. See id. at 1259-60.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. The court acknowledged that there were two undesirable consequences of its
ruling: no proper remedy available for seamen, and a lack of judicial sanctions for a pri-
vate agent's willful denial of benefits. See id. at 1260.
43. Id.
44. The language of the statute reads: "Where a remedy is provided by this chapter it
shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject matter
against the agent or employee of the United States." 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1994). A
strict reading of § 745 suggests that a seaman can only sue the United States if that section
applies.
45. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
46. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 963-69.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); GILMoRE & BLACK,
1997]
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in which the United States was plaintiff, no special problem was cre-
ated; but in suits brought against the government the problem of
sovereign immunity arose.4 Traditionally, the United States gov-
ernment has been immune from suit unless Congress specifically
waives that immunity.4  Before Congress enacted the SAA, the
United States government was immune from suits brought in admi-
ralty.5
0
Enacted in 1920,51 the SAA is a comprehensive waiver of sover-
eign immunity for claims filed by seamen against the federal
government." The Act first provides that no government-owned or
operated vessel or cargo is subject to in rem process. 3 It further pro-
vides that "if such vessel or cargo [is] privately owned or operated,
... a proceeding in admiralty [can] be maintained," and where the
vessel is a merchant vessel, a seaman's action in personam can be
brought against the United States in admiralty.- The legislative in-
tent was to place the government, "which had entered into the
activity of merchant shipping during World War I, on a parity with
private shippers and shipowners regarding liability."55
However, "[p]rior to 1950, seamen seeking to recover for the
wrongful acts of agents of the United States faced an area of law
which was mired in uncertainty."56 Although the SAA did not ex-
supra note 3, at 980-82.
48. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 982.
49. See Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2096 (1996) ("A waiver of the Federal Gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will
not be implied." (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992);
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990))).
50. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 982.
51. Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 741-52 (1994)).
52. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 742. See generally Donald S. Ingraham, Note, The Suits in
Admiralty Act and the Implied Discretionary Function, 1982 DUKE L.J. 146 (discussing
whether the SAA contains an implied discretionary function exemption).
53. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 741. This provision is of little importance because of the
existence of the maritime lien as a security device, backed by the full faith and credit of
the United States Government. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 982. A mari-
time lien is a privileged claim on a vessel, enforceable in admiralty court, for some service
rendered to the vessel or for an injury caused by the vessel. See The Westmoor, 27 F.2d
886, 887 (D. Or. 1928). For comprehensive treatment of maritime liens see GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 3, 586-817; Symposium, Maritime Liens and Securities, Ship Sales and
Finance, 47 TUL. L. REV. 489 (1973).
54. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 742. In admiralty court, there is no entitlement to a jury
trial. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 343.
55. Joseph R. Ballard, Comment, The Suits in Admiralty Act: Sovereign Benevolence
in Need of Reform, 7 MAR. LAW. 283,283-84 (1982).
56. Shields v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 187, 189 (M.D. Fla. 1987); see infra notes
58-124 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty courts have faced in applying the
[Vol. 75644
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plicitly provide for an exclusive remedy, courts applied the exclusivity
rule in suits against private agents of government-owned vessels."
Among the early cases in which the Supreme Court considered
the exclusivity of the remedy under the SAA was Johnson v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,s a consolidated opin-
ion of four separate appeals." In Johnson, the defendants argued
that plaintiffs' remedies were provided exclusively by the SAA, and
since the action was not commenced within the two years prescribed
by the Act, the claim was barred.' The Court stated that the SAA
"'provides a remedy in admiralty for adjudicating and satisfying all
maritime claims arising out of the possession or operation of mer-
chant vessels of the United States and the corporations, in which the
obligation of the United States is substituted for that of the corpora-
tions.' ,,1 The Johnson Court was aware that ultimately, the United
States would have to pay any judgment granted because it was "the
real party affected in all of these actions." 2 Thus, the Court, in a
brief opinion, concluded that the remedies given by the SAA were
exclusive in all cases to which it applied.' Accordingly, the plaintiffs'
claims were all dismissed. 4
The Johnson decision denied relief to many seamen "who had
theretofore brought suits against the [Fleet] Corporation or its agents
SAA).
57. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791-94 (1949); John-
son v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320, 325-27 (1930),
overruled by Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575,578 (1943).
58. 280 U.S. 320 (1930), overruled by Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 578
(1943). One of the three companion cases to Johnson was Fleet Corp. v. Lustgarten. See
id at 322-23. In that case, a merchant vessel owned by the United States was operated by
a private company pursuant to a contract made through the Fleet Corporation. See id. A
seaman employed thereon sued the Fleet Corporation and the private agent to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained in that service. See id.
59. Three of the cases involved seamen employed aboard ships owned by the gov-
ernment and operated by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation, a public entity. See id. at 322-25. The plaintiffs were seeking recovery from
Fleet Corporation, a wholly-owned government corporation, and the United States, as
owner of the vessels. See id.
60. See id. at 322-24.
61. Id. at 326 (quoting Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 276 U.S. 202,213 (1928)).
62. See itt at 327. Because the government owned the Fleet Corporation, the United
States ultimately would have to pay any judgment entered against the Fleet Corporation.
See id. However, the Court did not distinguish private agents from public agents. See id.
63. Although the SAA did not at that time have an express exclusivity provision, the
Court concluded that the SAA was "'intended to furnish the exclusive remedy in admi-
ralty against the United States ... on all maritime causes of action arising out of the
possession or operation of merchant vessels.'" Id (quoting Rosenberg Bros., 276 U.S. at
214).
64. See id.
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in reliance upon the prevailing theory as to the status of the law, and
whose rights to bring suits anew against the United States after the
date of the decision had expired" under the two-year SAA statute of
limitations." In response, Congress amended the SAA, reviving for
such litigants their rights to sue the United States within a certain
time.66
This measure, however, still left unresolved the question of
whether the remedy under the SAA was exclusive. In 1943, the Su-
preme Court attempted to provide an answer with its decision in
Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co.67 In Brady, the Court concluded
that private agents were not free from liability for their own wrongful
conduct just because the SAA provided a remedy against the United
States.Y8 The vessel in question in Brady was owned by the United
States and operated by a private company." The claimant was the
estate of a customs inspector who died after falling from a ladder
which broke as he climbed it.7' The estate brought a suit for negli-
gence against the private operator." While the lower court dismissed
the case in reliance on Johnson,2 the Supreme Court overruled John-
son in part and held that a seaman could sue a private operator for its
own torts' 3 In overruling part of Johnson, the Court distinguished
private operators of government-owned vessels from wholly owned
government corporations which operate government vessels, and
concluded that both the SAA itself-and the Johnson decision in in-
terpreting it-were only concerned with the latter.' The Brady
65. S. REP. No. 81-1782, at 2 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4209,4209-10.
66. See Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 315,47 Stat. 420 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
app. § 745 (1994)).
67. 317 U.S. 575 (1943).
68. See id. at 578-83.
69. See id. at 578.
70. See id. at 576.
71. See id at 577. The Court recognized that the case was a maritime tort subject to
admiralty jurisdiction. See id In De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418,444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)
(No. 3,776), Justice Story announced that admiralty jurisdiction "extends over all con-
tracts, (wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of
the stipulations,) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea." Id.
For a more detailed explanation of admiralty jurisdiction, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note
11, at 1-78.
72. See Brady, 317 U.S. at 577. The suit was originally brought in state court and
later removed to federal district court. See id The district court denied respondent's
motion to dismiss on the authority of Johnson, and after a trial by jury, a verdict was re-
turned for petitioner. See id On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
with directions to dismiss. See id.
73. See idL at 578.
74. See id at 582. The Court admitted that there was "ample support for the holding
in the Johnson case that... the Suits in Admiralty Act was intended to provide the only
[Vol. 75646
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Court relied on agency theory, stating that "[t]he liability of an agent
for his own negligence had long been embedded in the law."'75
Moreover, the Court reasoned, "withdrawal of the right to sue the
agent for his torts would result at times in a substantial dilution of the
rights of claimants," ranging from being barred by the SAA's statute
of limitations to being left with no remedy whatsoever." Further re-
treating from Johnson, the Court pronounced that "if Congress had
intended to make such an inroad on the rights of claimants it would
have said so in unambiguous terms." ' In addressing the defendant's
contention that the United States would ultimately pay the judgment
by reason of the contract agreement between the defendant and the
government, the Brady Court cautioned that "[t]he right of the pri-
vate operator to recover from the United States [was] a matter of
favor, not of right .... More importantly, the Court found it diffi-
available remedy against the United States or its wholly owned corporations for enforce-
ment of maritime causes of action covered by the Act." IL at 579. However, the Brady
Court made the distinction that the Act was not intended "to abolish all remedies which
might exist against a private company for torts committed during its operation of gov-
ernment vessels under agency agreements." Id.
75. ld. at 580. Citing an old principle that" 'the agent, because he is agent, does not
cease to be answerable for his acts,'" the Court further recognized the policy that "when
it comes to the utilization of corporate facilities in the broadening phases of federal activi-
ties in the commercial or business field, immunity from suit is not favored." Id. (quoting
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S.
549, 567 (1922)) (footnote omitted).
76. See id at 581. Explaining the dilution of claimants' rights, the Court said that
there would be instances in which no one would be liable if the private operator could not
be held accountable. See id. Also, under agency law concepts, the principal is not liable
for every negligent act of his agent in the context of the SAA; therefore, the government
will not always be liable for every negligent act of a private agent who operates govern-
ment-owned vessels. See id. Further, if all suits under such circumstances must be
brought against the United States, the short statute of limitation would apply to prevent
some worthy claimants from obtaining a remedy. See id.
77. ld. Section 741 of the SAA provides that no vessel owned by the United States or
a government corporation or "operated by or for the United States or such corporation
... shall ... be subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process .... ." 46 U.S.C. app. § 741
(1994). Section 742 also provides that a libel in personam may be brought in admiralty
against the United States for privately owned or possessed merchant vessels. See 46
U.S.C. app. § 742. The Brady Court explained that § 741 meant that "the right to arrest
or seize the vessel was taken away whether the vessel was operated by the United States,"
its wholly-owned corporation, or by a private company pursuant to a government con-
tract. See Brady, 317 U.S. at 579. The Act therefore precluded "remedies which would
otherwise exist on maritime causes of action arising out of operation of government ves-
sels by private companies" or the government's wholly owned corporations. Id. However
the Court pointed out that § 742 did not mention private operators, nor did the committee
reports mention private operators except as they may be affected by § 741, and therefore
§ 742 did not take away any personal remedy which a tort claimant might have against
such a private operator. See id. at 579-80.
78. See Brady, 317 U.S. at 582.
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cult to see how the petitioner could be deprived of a cause of action
against the private agent merely by reason of a contract between the
private operator and the government.79
Closely interacting with the SAA is the Jones Act, also enacted
in 1920.'o The Act provides in part that any "seaman who shall suffer
personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election,
maintain an action for damages at law .... ."" The Jones Act is de-
signed to give seamen a choice of bringing an action either in
admiralty or as a civil action in state or federal court against his em-
ployer. With the forces of both the SAA and the Jones Act, it might
appear that seamen have a potent weapon with which to guard their
fights.
However, in construing the Jones Act, courts have been inconsis-
tent and unclear. Moreover, the exclusivity rule under the SAA was
still uncertain after the Brady decision. As a result of the myriad of
potential traps, many plantiffs' suits against private agents operating
government vessels were dismissedY Before the SAA was amended
in 1950, the Court attempted to clarify whether the SAA and the
Jones Act barred suits against private agents or operators of govern-
79. See id. at 583. Moreover, the Court stated that if an agent" 'is sued for conduct
harmful to the plaintiff his only shield is a constitutional rule of law that exonerates
him.'" Id. at 584 (quoting Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 567).
80. See Jones Act of 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 46 U.S.C. app. (1994)). For a general discussion of the Jones Act, see Peter
Beer, Keeping up with the Jones Act, 61 TUL. L. REV. 379 (1986).
81. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994). Under the Jones Act, "[a]s a general proposition,
anyone who is the victim of a maritime tort is entitled to bring an action in admiralty in
rem or in personam or to pursue his remedy outside the admiralty" context as a regular
action at law. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 328. The Jones Act provides in part
that any "seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law." 46 U.S.C. app. § 688.
82. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688. The Jones Act does not specify against whom a plaintiff
may bring an in personam action, only stating that the injury giving rise to the action must
occur "in the course of... employment." Id. Generally, however, the defendant must be
the employer or operator of a vessel. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 335.
83. One issue under the Jones Act was who constituted a potentially liable employer.
See, e.g., Mahramas v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 170-72 (2d
Cir. 1973) (holding that a vessel's owner was not liable under the Jones Act because he
was not the plaintiff's employer); Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d
1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding an independent contractor who was neither the owner
nor the operator of the vessel liable as an employer under the Act); see also GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 3, at 335. For further discussion on the issues arising from the Jones
Act and the cases in the Fifth Circuit, see generally Symposium, Fifth Circuit Symposium:
Admiralty, 36 LoY. L. REV. 541,543-52 (1990).
84. See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 800-01 (1949);
Johnson v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320, 327 (1930),
overruled by Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575,578 (1943).
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ment-owned vessels.'
In Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
faced the puzzle of interpreting the Jones Act. The issue in Hust was
whether under a wartime agency contract, a general agent was an
employer within the meaning of the Jones Act." The Oregon Su-
preme Court applied common law agency principles and ruled that
the United States, not Moore-McCormack, was the employer." Con-
cluding that only employers could be sued under the Jones Act, the
Oregon court decided that a suit against the United States should
have been brought under the SAA.89 However, the United States
Supreme Court found it a "fallacy" to think that "the case would be
controlled by the common-law rules of private agency."" Moreover,
the Court stated that the purpose of the SAA "was to expand, not
restrict, the seaman's rights."'" The Court could therefore not logi-
cally conclude "that the wartime shipping operation had been
designed to deprive merchant seamen ... of their pre-existing rights
and to restrict them to a suit in admiralty against the United States."'
Finally, the Court specified that unless it allowed the seaman to sue
the agent, it would in effect resurrect the exclusivity rule of Johnson.93
Promoting a humanitarian policy towards seamen, the Court's hold-
ing that the seaman could sue the general agent under the Jones Act
resulted in further departure from the exclusivity rule.94
Having deviated from the exclusivity rule announced in Johnson,
the Court one year later in Caldarola v. Eckert5 severely questioned
85. See infra notes 86-117 and accompanying text.
86. 328 U.S. 707 (1946), overruled by Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337
U.S. 783,794 (1949).
87. See id. at 711.
88. See id. at 712-14. The Supreme Court of Oregon decided that under Oregon state
law, a general agent was not an employer and therefore dismissed the suit. See Hust v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 P.2d 275, 286 (Or. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 707 (1946),
overruled by Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783,794 (1949).
89. See Hust, 328 U.S. at 719.
90. Id. at 724-25.
91. Id. at 723. The Court also stated that the SAA "was not an emergency measure,
adopted to promote the war effort. It was normal, peacetime legislation, fitting into a
settled scheme of private rights." Id.
92. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 461; see Hust, 328 U.S. at 732-33.
93. See Hust, 328 U.S. at 719-20. The Court reasoned: "With a variety of rights es-
tablished in law and custom, the sudden shift of all relief ... to the single forum and
remedy could not but bring widespread surprise and a resulting failure of substantive
rights [of seamen]." Id. at 720.
94. See id. at 719-20.
95. 332 U.S. 155 (1947).
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the Hust decision.96 In Caldarola, a stevedore was injured while un-
loading cargo from a ship owned by the United States but managed
by Moore-McCormack Lines as general agent. 7  The petitioner
brought an action in law in New York state court against the general
agent instead of in admiralty against the United States." The Su-
preme Court, in ruling that the agent was not responsible for the
stevedore's injury, made an attempt to distinguish Hust." Just as the
lower court had done in Hust,"' the New York Court of Appeals
looked to state law and decided that the agent could not be regarded
as the employer under the agency contract."' Contrary to what it had
done in Hust, the Supreme Court decided Caldarola according to
state rules of private agency.0 2 The Court distinguished Hust on the
ground that it represented a "liberal construction" of the Jones Act
not applicable in a non-statutory action. 3 Without expressly over-
96. Although the Caldarola Court did not overrule Hust, it undermined the founda-
tions of Hust by ruling that it did not control in the instant case, even though the facts
were quite similar. See id at 159. The distinction between Hust and Caldarola was set
forth in Caldarola's dissenting opinion. See id. at 161-62 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). As
Justice Rutledge pointed out, Hust concerned the rights of seamen, not the rights of ste-
vedores; also it arose under the Jones Act, not maritime tort. See id at 161 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); infra note 98 (noting the difference between seamen and stevedores).
97. See Caldarola, 332 U.S. at 156-57.
98. See id at 157. The reason that the petitioner did not bring an action against the
United States in admiralty was presumably to obtain the benefit of trial by jury. See id.
Moreover, a stevedore is "[o]ne who is employed in the loading or unloading of ships,"
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1764 (3d ed.
1992), as opposed to a member of the ship's crew, and hence might not even qualify as a
"seaman" under the definition of the Jones Act. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at
328. Just who does qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act is unclear:
The Jones Act plaintiff must be a "seaman" who is injured (or killed) "in the
course of his employment." The "course of ... employment" requirement at
least excluded passengers, guests, trespassers, pirates (unless of course the pirate
was suing his own employer) and so on. Who else might be excluded (or in-
cluded) was, as a matter of initial construction, impossible to say. After a half-
century of litigation the answer to the riddle is not apparent.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994)) (footnote omitted).
99. See Caldarola, 332 U.S. at 159-60.
100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining the Oregon court's ruling).
101. See Caldarola v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 68 N.E.2d 444, 445 (N.Y. 1946), affid
sub nom. Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947).
102. See Caldarola, 332 U.S. at 160; cf. supra text accompanying note 90 (explaining
that the Hust Court thought it a "fallacy" that state agency law should control its deci-
sion).
103. See Caldarola, 332 U.S. at 159. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Hust case,
unlike Caldarola, arose from the Jones Act, and consequently the Court held that under
the agency contract the agent was the "employer" of an injured seaman. See id. How-
ever, the Court went on to state that Hust "did not hold that the Agency contract made
the Agent for all practical purposes the owner of the vessel." Id.
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ruling Hust, Caldarola nevertheless cast doubt on its validity."4
Two years after Caldarola, the Court in Cosmopolitan Shipping
Co. v. McAllister0 ' revisited the issue in the Hust case: whether a
general agent was liable under the Jones Act "to a member of the
crew who suffered physical injury through the negligence of the mas-
ter and officers of' a government-owned vessel.' While Hust was
decided on humanitarian grounds, 07 Cosmopolitan Shipping was a
more theoretical opinion."s The Supreme Court noted that Hust
misinterpreted the Brady decision."9 The Brady case, according to
the Cosmopolitan Shipping Court, "decided no more, directly or by
implication, than that an action could be maintained against agents of
the United States at the common law for the agents' own torts."'"0
The Court next decided that Brady did not control since it "did not
involve the right to recover against employers under the Jones
Act.' The Court then considered whether the agent was McAllis-
ter's employer under the Jones Act."' Following the approach taken
in Caldarola,"' the majority applied common law agency principles to
the Jones Act, eventually concluding that the United States, not the
general agent, was the "employer.""' 4 Flatly overruling Hust, the
104. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 793 (1949) ("The
Caldarola case undermined the foundations of Hust.") (citation omitted).
105. 337 U.S. 783 (1949).
106. Id at 785. McAllister, while on board the vessel, contracted poliomyelitis. See id
at 786. "Because of the alleged negligence of the master and officers in furnishing proper
treatment, he suffered permanent injury from the disease." Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 94.
108. See Cosmopolitan Shipping, 337 U.S. at 787-91. The Court stated that it could
"not disregard the plain and rational meaning of employment and employer to furnish a
seaman a cause of action against one completely outside the broadest lines or definitions
of employment or employer." Id. at 791.
109. See id at 789. As characterized in Cosmopolitan Shipping, the Court had found
the general agent in Hust liable to the seaman according to the following logic:
[F]irst, that the overruling of Fleet Corporation v. Lustgarten by Brady v. Roose-
velt S.S. Co. gave a seaman a right to sue under the Jones Act such general
agents as were employed under contracts like Moore-McCormack's for torts
committed against seamen by masters and crew; second, that although
"technically the agreement makes Hust an employee of the United States," the
"rules of private agency" should not be applied to take away "protections" from
seamen.
Id. at 787-88 (quoting Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707, 716-22, 723, 724
(1946), overruled by Cosmopolitan Shipping, 337 U.S. at 794) (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 789.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 793.
113. Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155, 160 (1947); see supra notes 95-104 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Caldarola decision).
114. See Cosmopolitan Shipping, 337 U.S. at 793-800. The Court stated: "We do not
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Cosmopolitan Shipping Court held "that an agent such as Cosmopoli-
tan, who contract[ed] to manage certain shoreside business of a vessel
operated by the War Shipping Administration, [was] not liable to a
seaman for injury caused by the negligence of the master or crew of
such a vessel.. 15
Cosmopolitan Shipping held that a seaman employed on a gov-
ernment-owned, privately-operated vessel could not sue the private
agent managing the vessel as an employer."6 The Court did not over-
rule Brady, which had allowed seamen to sue private agents for the
torts of their own employees."7
Given the uncertain and sometimes confusing judicial back-
ground and the Supreme Court's effort in Cosmopolitan Shipping to
clarify the issue of the exclusivity rule, Congress in 1950 amended the
SAA by modifying § 745. u1 The newly amended section provided in
part that "where a remedy is provided by this chapter it shall hereaf-
ter be exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject
matter against the agent or employee of the United States ... whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim."' 9 The legislative history of
§ 745 indicates that lawmakers took into account the limited nature
of the Cosmopolitan Shipping decision, and Congress intended for an
agent to be "liable for the negligence of its own employees, [but] not
for the negligence of the civil-service masters and crews with whom
the United States manned vessels."' The Senate committee further
stated that "the legislation [was] not intended to affect existing rights
of seamen against their vessels or against private companies who op-
erate[d] Government-owned vessels, or to affect remedies which may
exist against other parties involved by existing law in any appropriate
forum."' 2' Thus, § 745 made it clear that a seaman can no longer sue
think it consistent to hold that the general agent has enough 'possession and control' to be
an employer under the Jones Act but not enough to be responsible for maintenance under
New York law." ld. at 793.115. Id. at 801.
116. See id. at 787-89.
117. See id. The Court emphasized Hust's misinterpretation of Brady, but only over-
ruled Hust. See id. Brady was thereby preserved. See id. 'Thus, even after
Cosmopolitan Shipping, a seaman on a ship owned by the United States, but [operated by
a private company who] hired the masters and crew, should have been able to sue the
agent for maritime torts occurring on the ship." Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1258.
118. See Act of Dec. 13, 1950, ch. 1136, 64 Stat. 1112 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 745
(1994)).
119. 46 U.S.C. app. § 745.
120. S. REP. No. 81-1782, at 2 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4209, 4209. The
Senate report specifically stated that "[flor the negligence of those, the United States was
the only responsible party." Id., reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4210.
121. Id.
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the agent as if the agent were the employer responsible for all negli-
gent conduct occurring on the vessel."' However, it was not clear
whether the word "agent" used in the statute meant only a govern-
ment agent, because the Brady Court held that a private agent of a
government vessel was not exonerated from liability,'2' and the case
was not overruled by Cosmopolitan Shipping. Therefore, presumably
the Brady rule was still good law without express legislative intent to
the contrary. 4
Since the enactment of § 745, many courts have considered the
issue of whether a seaman can sue the private agent of a government-
owned vessel.'" Because the Jones Act was no longer available for
the seaman to sue the agent as the employer," seamen could only sue
the agent if the meaning of § 745 allowed the suit under the SAA.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Manuel presented two inquiries
into the meaning of § 745. The first inquiry probed the legislative
intent behind § 745.127 Fully aware of the twists and turns from John-
son to Brady, and from Hust to Cosmopolitan Shipping,1' the Manuel
122. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783,801 (1949).
123. See Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575,580 (1943).
124. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
125. Following the Manuel court, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a claim for
willful failure to pay maintenance and cure against a private operator of a government
vessel is precluded by § 745. See Kasprik v. United States, 87 F.3d 462, 466 (11th Cir.
1996). At least four federal district courts have ruled similarly. See Stewart v. United
States, 903 F. Supp. 1540, 1544 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (finding seaman's suit against private
agent for unpaid wages and insufficient maintenance payments barred by § 745); Smith v.
MAR Inc., 896 F. Supp. 75,77 (D.R.I. 1995) (finding seaman's claim against private agent
for willful denial of maintenance and cure barred by § 745); Fratus v. United States, 859
F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same); Farnsworth v. Sea-Land Serv., No. CIV.A.
87-5954, 1989 WL 20544, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 1989) (same), affd, 896 F.2d 552 (5th
Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision).
Three other federal district courts have concluded that such claims are not precluded
by § 745. See Abogado v. International Marine Carriers, 890 F. Supp. 626, 631-32 (S.D.
Tex. 1995) (allowing seaman to sue private agent for willful denial of maintenance and
cure despite § 745); Henderson v. International Marine Carriers, 1990 AM. MAR. CASES
400, 402 (E.D. La. 1989) (same), aff'd, 921 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table
decision); Shields v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 187, 190-91 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (allowing
suit against private agent for willful denial of maintenance and cure). Shields was the first
federal case to address whether § 745 precluded seamen from suing private agents for
willful denial of maintenance and cure. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1255. Its reasoning was
considered and expressly rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Manuel and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Kasprik. See Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 465-66; Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1257; infra notes 129,
140-50 and accompanying text.
126. Under Cosmopolitan Shipping, an agent was not considered an employer and
therefore could not be sued under the Jones Act. See Cosmopolitan Shipping, 337 U.S. at
793.
127. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1257-59.
128. See supra notes 58-124 and accompanying text.
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court believed that by adding the exclusivity rule, Congress intended
for all claims of loss caused by government-owned vessels to be di-
rected at the United States. 29
In reaching the conclusion that Congress intended § 745 to re-
quire a seaman to sue the United States on any maritime action that
is covered by § 745, the Fourth Circuit relied on one Senate report
and the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson.' Despite the fact that
Johnson was overruled by Brady,3' and that Cosmopolitan Shipping
was a narrow holding in that it merely decided that an agent who con-
tracted to manage a government-owned vessel was "not liable to a
seaman for injury caused by the negligence of the master or crew of
such a vessel, ' ' 2 the Manuel court found that Congress intended to
codify the exclusivity rule of Johnson when it amended § 745133 This
conclusion was premised on a sentence in Senate Report 2535. Al-
though Congress appeared to understand the narrow nature of the
Cosmopolitan Shipping holding in Senate Report 1782, Senate Re-
port 2535 went a step further by stating that "[ihe first proviso [of
§ 745] declares the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Cosmo-
politan Shipping... and Johnson... that the remedy under the Suits
in Admiralty Act is exclusive."'' 4 Given the ambiguous legislative
history of § 745, the Manuel court chose to accept that Congress in-
tended to revive the Johnson holding and make § 745 the exclusive
remedy for seamen aboard government-owned vessels.
In the second inquiry of the Manuel opinion, the Fourth Circuit
decided that the language of § 745 also prevents a seaman from suing
the private operator of a government-owned ship for the arbitrary
129. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1259. As also indicated in the legislative history, the Sen-
ate committee believed that Cosmopolitan Shipping made it "plain that the agent, while
liable for the negligence of its own employees, was not liable for the negligence of the
civil-service masters and crews with whom the United States manned the vessels."
S. REP. No. 81-1782, at 2 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4209, 4210.
130. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1257-59. For a different interpretation of the legislative
intent behind § 745, see Shields, 662 F. Supp. at 190 (concluding that Congress intended
the exclusivity rule to apply only to recovery for wrongful acts committed in the manage-
ment of a ship, not to situations involving the willful conduct of a private agent's
insurance department). The Fourth Circuit was unpersuaded by the Shields opinion. See
Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1257 ("We ... disagree with the Shields court's characterization of
Congress's intent in enacting the exclusivity provision.").
131. See Johnson v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320
(1930), overruled by Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 578 (1943).
132. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783,801 (1949).
133. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1259 ("Thus, Congress enacted the exclusivity rule of
Johnson, but clearly believed that its action was consistent with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cosmopolitan Shipping.").
134. S. REP. No. 81-2535, at 2-3 (1950), reprinted in 1951 AM. MAR. CASES 149, 151.
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and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.135 According to the
language of § 745, the SAA is "exclusive of any other action by rea-
son of the same subject matter."'136 The focal point of the Manuel
decision was whether willful denial of maintenance and cure claims
were "of the same subject matter" as ordinary maintenance and cure
claims. The Fourth Circuit found that Manuel's claim stemmed from
his entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from his injury
while employed on a vessel.137 Even though Manuel's claim against
the private operator highlighted the wrongful conduct of the opera-
tor's administrative employees, the Manuel court believed that this
claim nevertheless fell into the same subject matter as a general claim
for maintenance and cure.3' Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Manuel's claim fell under the purview of § 745, and because § 745
provides the exclusive remedy for a seaman aboard a government-
owned vessel, Manuel could not sue the private operator.
139
However, the Manuel opinion overlooked a valid argument set
forth in Shields v. United States, 4' the first federal case ever to con-
sider whether willful denial of maintenance and cure is the same
subject matter as a general claim for maintenance and cure.' The
Shields court recognized a distinction between seeking damages for
an action that occurred in the operation of the vessel and seeking
damages for the arbitrary and willful conduct of the private opera-
tor's insurance department in handling benefits claims.42 The
Manuel court, however, did not accept this distinction.43 If it had, the
135. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1259.
136. 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1994).
137. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1259-60.
138. See icL The Manuel court held that willful denial of a seaman's benefits claim was
merely an extension of an ordinary maintenance and cure claim, and thus was of the same
subject matter. See id.
139. See id.
140. 662 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
141. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1255; see also supra note 125.
142. See Shields, 662 F. Supp. at 190. The district court found that the SAA "was not
designed to preclude recovery for arbitrary claims handling." Id. Rather, it was used to
foreclose any other negligence claims arising from the same subject matter. See id.
Moreover, the Shields court noted that when it amended § 745, Congress understood
Cosmopolitan Shipping to protect private agents from suits based on the negligence of the
masters and crews who manned government-contracted vessels, but that agents remained
liable for the negligence of their own employees. See id (citing S. REP. No. 81-1782, at 2
(1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4209,4210); see also Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.
v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 801 (1949) ("[A]n agent ... who contracts to manage certain
shoreside business of a vessel operated by the War Shipping Administration, is not liable
to a seaman for injury, caused by the negligence of the master or crew of such a vessel.").
143. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1259. The Manuel court stated that although the claim
highlighted the wrongful conduct of the agent's administrative employees, the action
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Fourth Circuit might have looked at Brady1" and determined that the
SAA did not free the private agent from liability for the torts of its
own employees.
The Fourth Circuit's approach in Manuel was, nevertheless,
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Kasprik
v. United States.' Although the Eleventh Circuit ultimately agreed
with the reasoning in Manuel,'" the Kasprik court recognized Shields
as a "noteworthy" opinion which was both "persuasive" and "easily
understandable."'47 As the Eleventh Circuit observed, "the [Shields]
court reasoned that no 'remedy' is provided by the SAA '[w]ith re-
gard to the "subject matter" of an arbitrary and willful denial of
maintenance and cure benefits.' '4 The Kasprik court also noted the
distinction drawn in Shields "between the simple failure to provide
maintenance and cure," which comes under the purview of the SAA,
and "the arbitrary and willful denial of such, for which no such rem-
edy is provided."'' Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
the Shields court's conclusion that "'arbitrary claims handling is an
entirely different subject matter from the negligent conduct for which
the SAA provides a remedy.' ",5 Although the Kasprik court even-
tually followed the Fourth Circuit, the only other federal court of
appeals that had decided this issue, it nevertheless admitted that its
ruling could be interpreted as unjust.' Therefore, the court appealed
to Congress for clarification or change in the legislation so as to pro-
nonetheless arose from the seaman's entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from
his injury on a government-owned ship. See id
144. Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943). The Brady Court held that
a government agent" 'does not cease to be answerable for his acts.'" Id. at 580 (quoting
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S.
549, 567 (1921)). Later, the Cosmopolitan Shipping Court specifically preserved this
holding. See Cosmopolitan Shipping, 337 U.S. at 789.
145. 87 F.3d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court of Alaska has also fol-
lowed the Manuel court. See Stone v. International Marine Carriers, Inc., 918 P.2d 551,
554 (Alaska 1996).
146. See Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 465.
147. See id The Eleventh Circuit did note, "[h]owever, we are also aware that its
[Shields's] reasoning has been questioned and rejected." Id.
148. Id. (quoting Shields v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 187, 190 (M.D. Fla. 1987)
(alteration in original)). The Shields court also concluded that a seaman who was wrong-
fully denied maintenance and cure could sue the private agent for punitive damages. See
Shields, 662 F. Supp. at 191. However, the proposition that the seaman could sue for pu-
nitive damages was later seriously questioned and rejected by several courts. See infra
notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
149. Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 465 (citing Shields, 662 F. Supp. at 190).
150. Shields, 662 F. Supp. at 190, quoted in Kasprik, 87 F.3d. at 465; see supra notes
141-43 and accompanying text.
151. See Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 466 n.2.
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vide better protection to seamen.52
In Manuel, the Fourth Circuit's opinion reflected the same con-
cern, common among the courts that have considered the exclusivity
rule issue.153 The Manuel court candidly acknowledged that as a re-
sult of the decision, "private operators managing ships owned by the
United States can arbitrarily and willfully refuse to pay an injured
seaman's maintenance and cure without suffering any penalty." '154
Hence, the Manuel court in the end noted that "[i]f Congress consid-
ers this situation to be unfair, it can correct the problem by carving
out a maintenance and cure exception to the exclusivity rule, by
waiving the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to puni-
tive damages in maintenance and cure suits, or by taking some other
legislative action."155 The court was concerned that seamen on gov-
ernment-owned vessels operated by private agents would not be on
an equal footing with seamen on private vessels. 6 The difference lies
in the remedies a seaman may pursue if he is injured. Traditionally,
the remedies available to a private-vessel seaman who is arbitrarily
denied maintenance and cure consisted of three components: (1)
compensatory damages for withheld maintenance and cure; (2) puni-
tive damages; and (3) attorney's fees."'
As to compensatory damages, because the government is ulti-
mately answerable under the SAA, a public-vessel seaman does not
lose anything if § 745 provides an exclusive remedy.5 8 With respect
to punitive damages, however, the government has not waived sover-
eign immunity.159 In suits against private owner-employers, though,
punitive damages traditionally have been available to seamen claim-
ing willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.' However, recent
152. See id. Although the Kasprik court commended the Shields reasoning in detail, it
followed the Manuel court decision without much explanation, other than citing several
sentences from Manuel. See id. at 465-66.
153. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1260; see, e.g., Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 466; Stone v. Interna-
tional Marine Carriers, Inc., 918 P.2d 551,555-56 (Alaska 1996).
154. Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1260.
155. Id.
156. See id.; see also Stone, 918 P.2d at 556 (expressing similar concern).
157. See Stone, 918 P.2d at 555; see also Shields v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 187, 191
(M.D. Fla. 1987) (noting that courts have traditionally granted punitive damages and
attorney's fees in willful denial of maintenance and cure cases).
158. See Stone, 918 P.2d at 555.
159. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 741 (1994).
160. See Hines v. J.A. Laporte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 1987) (awarding
punitive damages to seaman employed on privately owned vessel); Holmes v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110, 1118 (5th Cir. 1984) (same), overruled by Guevara v.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1513 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Robinson v.
Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048,1051 (1st Cir. 1973) (same).
1997]
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decisions have closed this door as well. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, recently concluded that "punitive damages should no longer be
available in cases of willful nonpayment of maintenance and cure un-
der the general maritime law." 161 In addition, the Ninth Circuit and a
federal district court have held that punitive damages are not avail-
able in willful nonpayment of benefits claims.' Thus, if courts
elsewhere accept this approach, § 745's exclusivity rule ultimately
would not leave seamen on government-owned vessels in a worse po-
sition, because punitive damages would be unavailable even if the
seaman could sue the private agent.
However, with regard to recovery of attorney's fees for a willful
failure to pay maintenance and cure claims, a discrepancy still exists
between the remedies available to injured seamen employed on pri-
vate vessels and those employed on government vessels. Because
attorney's fees are not authorized by the SAA, they are not available
to seamen whose claims are against the United States.•6 On the
other hand, seamen aboard private vessels are able to claim attor-
161. See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1513. The Fifth Circuit examined the Supreme Court
decision Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527,530-31 (1962), which awarded attorney's fees
to a seaman whose private employer wrongfully and in bad faith denied him maintenance
and cure payments. The attorney's fees in Vaughan were awarded because of bad faith
on the part of the employer, see id, and consequently, over the years, courts have charac-
terized the decision as authorizing not only attorney's fees, but also punitive damages.
See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1502 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 53 (1991)
(characterizing attorney's fees granted on account of one party's bad faith as "punitive");
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (same)). However, the Fifth Circuit in Guevara distin-
guished "tort-like" punitive damages from "make-whole" compensatory damages, and
concluded that Vaughan v. Atkinson could not be read to entitle a seaman to recover "a
punitive damages award in the tort sense of punishing the underlying conduct that gave
rise to the litigation." Id at 1503. The court concluded, "all we can confidently say about
Vaughan is that it entitles an injured seaman to recover attorney's fees-perhaps as part
of compensatory damages-when his employer willfully fails to pay maintenance and
cure." Id.
Vaughan was one of the principal cases on which the Fifth Circuit premised its con-
clusion in Holmes, 734 F.2d at 1118, that tort-like punitive damages were available in
maintenance and cure actions brought by private-vessel seamen against their employers.
In light of its reinterpretation of the Vaughan decision, however, the Fifth Circuit over-
ruled Holmes and held that punitive damages were no longer available to seamen on
privately owned vessels. See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1513.
162. See Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that punitive damages are no longer available in cases of willful nonpayment of
seamen's benefits); Boyd v. Cinmar of Gloucester, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 208, 209-11 (E.D.
Va. 1996) (holding punitive damages not recoverable); Carolina Clipper Inc. v. Axe, 902
F. Supp. 680,684 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same).
163. Attorney's fees may not be awarded against the United States in the absence of
specific statutory authority. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 267-68 (1975). The SAA provides no such authority. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52
(1994).
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ney's fees if their maintenance and cure is willfully withheld." Even
among those courts which have held that punitive damages are not
available to private-vessel seamen in maintenance and cure claims,
attorney's fees are still recoverable." As a result, the Manuel court's
decision barring seamen from suing the private agents of government
vessels has the effect of curtailing seamen's rights simply because
they happen to work on a vessel owned by the government.
Although the result in Manuel seems to be in the mainstream, it
has some ramifications which the Fourth Circuit may never have in-
tended. First, the Manuel ruling has "impos[ed] a penalty on a
seaman ... who works for the government under the auspices of a
private agent."'6' Second, the decision has given private agents of
government-owned vessels judicial sanction to act tortiously without
any punishment, 67 thus creating an economically inefficient result.
As was first explained by Justice Story in his 1823 opinion in Harden
v. Gordon, maintenance and cure is grounded in two rationales:
safety and efficiency. 68 "[R]equiring shipowners to bear the expenses
of maintenance and cure... encourages them to provide safer work-
164. See Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 530-31; Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th
Cir. 1986) ("Attorney's fees are available to a plaintiff when [a private party] refuses to
provide maintenance and cure in bad faith, callously, or unreasonably."). The need for
such a deterrent was explained by the Supreme Court in Vaughan:
It would be a sorry day for seamen if shipowners, knowing of the claim for main-
tenance and cure, could disregard it .... This would be a dreadful weapon in
the hands of unconscionable employers and a plain inducement ... to use the
withholding of maintenance and cure as a means of forcing sick seamen to go to
work when they should be resting .... This result is at war with the liberal atti-
tude that heretofore has obtained and with admiralty's tender regard for
seamen.
Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 533.
165. See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1503; Boyd, 919 F. Supp at 211.
166. See Abogado v. International Marine Carriers, 890 F. Supp. 626, 634 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (holding that a seaman could sue the government's agent for willful denial of main-
tenance and cure).
167. See Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1260.
168. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047). As
Justice Story explained:
In many voyages .... the whole wages [of seamen] are often insufficient to meet
the expenses occasioned by the perilous diseases of those insalubrious climates.
On the other hand, if these expenses are a charge upon the ship, the interest of
the owner will be immediately connected with that of the seamen. The master
will watch over their health with vigilance and fidelity. He will take the best
methods, as well to prevent diseases, as to ensure a speedy recovery from them.
He will never be tempted to abandon the sick to their forlorn fate; but his duty,
combining with the interest of his owner will lead him to succor their distress,
and shed a cheering kindness over the anxious hours of suffering and despon-
dency.
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ing environments, thereby reducing the number of accidents. 1 69
However, if private agents of government-owned ships are relieved
of liability for willful denial of maintenance and cure, the economi-
cally efficient policies behind maintenance and cure are undermined,
as agents will have no incentive to maintain an efficient and fair sys-
tem for seamen's claims.170
Finally, the Manuel court's holding runs contrary to the well-
established principles of admiralty jurisprudence. The law of admi-
ralty has traditionally been highly diligent in protecting a seaman's
right to maintenance and cure, and the seaman has always been seen
as a ward of the court.'' In the face of the federal policy favoring
seamen,172 the result of Manuel actually has curtailed seamen's right
to receive timely maintenance and cure benefits.
The enactment of § 745 in the SAA was a legislative attempt to
end the confusing and uncertain judicial decisions under the prior
Act and to afford seamen aboard government-owned vessels better
protection.' 3 However, under the current interpretation of the SAA
by the Fourth Circuit, seamen aboard government-owned vessels ac-
tually are afforded less protection than seamen on private vessels.
This unfair result is evident in the Fourth Circuit's conservative judi-
cial interpretation of § 745 of the SAA. Although this is a proper use
of the court's power, if it fails to respect the federal policy of favoring
169. McDaniel, supra note 3, at 674 (citing Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 483).
170. This argument is a product of law and economics analysis. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Barfield, Better to Give than to Receive: Should Nonprofit Corporations and Charities Pay
Punitive Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1193, 1212 n.100 (1995) ("The law and economics
analysis of tort law assumes that everyone is economically rational, and that a person will
engage in an activity if the benefit to be gained from the activity outweighs the costs of
the activity." (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3 (3d ed.
1985))).
171. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1962). The Vaughan Court noted
that "[a]dmiralty courts have been liberal in interpreting this duty 'for the benefit and
protection of seamen who are its wards.' ... [T]he shipowner's liability for maintenance
and cure was among 'the most pervasive' of all and ... it was not to be defeated by re-
strictive distinctions nor 'narrowly confined.'" Id. (quoting Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor,
303 U.S. 525,529 (1938); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724,735 (1943)).
172. See id. at 532. The Vaughan Court stated that "[w]hen there are ambiguities or
doubts, they are resolved in favor of the seaman." Id. (citing Warren v. United States, 340
U.S. 523, 530 (1951)). Also, at the time of the SAA's enactment, § 745 reinforced the
statute's purpose of bolstering seamen's rights by allowing seamen who had sued the
wrong party one year to refile their suits against the United States, even if the regular
statute of limitations had run. See Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920, ch. 95, § 5, 41 Stat. 525,
526 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1994)); see also 46 U.S.C. app. § 745
note (Historical and Statutory Notes).
173. See S. REP. No. 81-1782, at 1-2 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4209,4209-
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seamen's rights, it nevertheless creates poor precedent. Court deci-
sions interpreting § 745 have reached conflicting results, and until
Congress solves the problem by clarifying the meaning of the section,
the law will remain both inconsistent and unjust.
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